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The Brief History of a Soul is the story of a lively debate whose arguments,
vocabulary, and even subject have evolved over millennia. In this historical
narrative cum apologia, Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro champion
“substance dualism,” a philosophical position that asserts the ontologically
distinct reality of matter and soul (or body and mind in post-Cartesian terms).
They largely succeed in their efforts to be “fair and balanced” (4) and succeed in
presenting a sophisticated and nuanced yet readable account of the controversy
in its philosophical and, to some extent, theological and scientific dimensions. As
entailed by the “Brief ” caveat, they maintain a disciplined focus on a relatively
few major players in this saga of the soul. Early in the book, the authors capture
just how unstable the concept of “soul” has been in Western thought. Classical
thought had already ranged from Plato’s independently (and pre-) existing soul
as discrete entity, to Aristotle’s non-dualistic version of the human soul as the
formed aspect of the body. Their decision to discuss only Plato and Aristotle
among pre-medieval thinkers is reasonable; less defensible is their curious
omission of a substantial line of thought in philosophy and theology that is both
important to thinking about the soul in its own right, and especially pertinent to
soul-related issues that the authors engage: free will. A commonplace among
Christian Fathers especially was the question of the soul’s origin. Origen, first
church theologian, believed that question was first in priority after addressing the
topic of the Trinity itself (On First Principles). Augustine, as the authors note in
chapter 2 (45), postulates four possibilities: traducianism (physical procreation of
the soul by parents), creationism (special creation by God at birth), sent
preexistence (God sends preexisting souls to be embodied) and fallen
preexistence (human choices result in the embodiment of their preexisting souls).
The authors address the merits of theories 1 and 2, but inexplicably drop here
and for the remainder of the book the other two options, although the theory of
the soul’s premortal existence figures prominently with the thought of dozens of
subsequent philosophers and theologians, many of whom they discuss. For Plato
the idea provided theodicy (Republic X). Augustine long favored preexistence as
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carrying less theological baggage than the alternatives and only retreated from the
idea when grace became a greater theological concern than free will. The authors
mention Henry More’s unconventional defense of a soul that was spatially
extended, but neglect his emphatic defense—along with a whole cohort of
Cambridge Platonists—of a preexistent soul. Locke found his theory of memory-
based human selfhood to render preexistence moot, and Kant, whom the authors
discuss along with all the above named, found the soul’s preexistence essential to
human agency. In the twentieth century as well, philosophers like John
McTaggart argued any conception of a human soul that did not posit its
preexistence could not adequately ground a theory of free will, which is clearly
of great import to Goetz and Taliaferro.
More important to these authors is a sustained defense of dualism itself; a
principal form this takes today is to insist that an immaterial soul is the most
effective solution to the “bundling problem” (87). David Berlinski articulates
one version of this dilemma: “How do the twitching nerves, chemical
exchanges, electrical flashes, and computational routines of the human eye
and brain provide a human being with experience? The gap opened between
causal sequences that with a moving finger we can trace from one point to
the next and the light-enraptured awareness to which they give rise is
unfathomably large because it spans an incommensurable distance” (David
Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and its Scientific Pretensions
[New York: Crown Forum, 2008] 204). The consistent historical description
of a soul that is “simple in nature” does not just result from the questionable
metaphysics of immaterial substance, but answers to the lived phenomenon
of first-person experience and the unity of consciousness.
Goetz and Taliaferro also devote considerable time on dualism’s principal
vulnerability: the mind-body problem. Though Aquinas gives it passing
attention, it remained for Descartes to give it its enduring form—interaction
with a body presupposes extension and contact, both of which are excluded
by immateriality. Though he tentatively located the node of maximum
interpenetration of mind and body in the pineal gland, he confessed “we
have no notion” of how causal interaction occurred (81). The authors do not
know either, but they are convinced that neither philosophy nor
contemporary science have found compelling arguments against the soul or
against mind-body interaction. Regarding science, their argument is largely a
matter of explaining why most recent developments are irrelevant to the
debate; mapping brain functions tells us much about cerebral geography, but
the real issue in current debates about the nature of mind has to do with
causal closure. This doctrine holds that all physical events have causes
originating in the physical domain; and since mental events are really
physical in nature, there is no necessity (or room) for non-physical causes
originating in mind or soul to explain physical events. The authors show
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why this argument is more about a naturalist set of presuppositions than
scientific method per se.
One of the book’s questionable steps is to buttress the argument against causal
closure by noting it is irreconcilable with any “explanatory space for God” (175).
What they present as an warning of logical inconsistency to Christian advocates
of causal closure sounds dangerously like an argument from faith in the context of
their larger polemic, their disclaimer notwithstanding. Similarly, they (and
Thomas Nagel) may be right that some critics of Intelligent Design misread
their own naturalistic assumptions (that is, causal closure) as simply good
science. But the controversial distraction of Intelligent Design can only detract
from this book’s larger purposes. And those larger purposes—tracing the
history of the soul and revealing the idea to be as timely and viable today as it
was for Plato and Augustine—are commendably executed.
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